時論廣場》2023大選年臺美關係觀察指標（方恩格 Ross Darrell Feingold）
美國總統拜登（Joe Biden）。（圖／路透）
2022年，筆者認爲拜登政府將對臺灣實施「臨時禁制令」（TRO），（TRO也是臺灣支持者期待將「臺北經濟文化代表處」更名爲「臺灣代表處」的縮寫。國會希望但未能在2022年實現），2022年的潛在禁制令項目包括：儘管萊豬公投結果仍難恢復貿易談判，拒絕邀請臺灣參加環太平洋軍事演習（RIMPAC），或者讓蔡英文總統和副總統賴清德到中美洲或加勒比地區國家時過境美國，參加公開活動。
事實證明，美國沒有邀請臺灣加入印太經濟框架，而是提出了「美臺21世紀貿易倡議」，臺灣沒有被邀請加入環太平洋軍演，賴副總統也低調於2022年1月前往宏都拉斯參加新總統卡斯楚（Xiomara Castro）就職典禮時中途過境美國。
對於臺美關係，有許多政治評論家都抱持着「正面思考」，做出遠比事實更美好的預測。筆者認爲與其將那些對於臺美情勢做出劃火柴許願般 「預測」奉爲圭臬，不如就更客觀實際的着眼點來討論，以下列舉五點供各位觀察與思考：
一、美國是否歡迎臺灣的總統參選人訪問華府：最近幾年的總統參選人都有在選前到華府參訪的奇怪習慣。民進黨蔡英文於2015年和2011年訪問了華府，中國國民黨主席朱立倫於2015年訪問華府，並在2022年作爲其「影子」總統競選的一部分再次訪問華府。筆者不認同臺灣的總統候選人赴美尋求美國政府肯定的印象。總統候選人不應浪費時間進行這種在臺北就很容易做到的對話，訪問華府對國民黨候選人或民衆黨候選人柯文哲來說都是錯誤的。
二、美國總統候選人是否訪臺：2024年1月開始的政黨總統候選人提名初選，對於尋求共和黨提名的候選人來說，訪問臺灣是證明他們比其他候選人更能「抗中保臺」的一種方式。可能的候選人蓬佩奧在2022年兩度訪問臺灣。其他潛在的候選人也可能訪臺，包括佛羅里達州州長德桑提斯，他受到共和黨選民的擁戴，他擁有州政府的資源，可以打着促進佛羅里達州出口的幌子訪問臺灣，誰讓中國議題成爲他在去年成功連任競選中的競選主軸。
三、美臺21世紀貿易倡議是否在今年下半年會宣佈協議：若達成協議將有助民進黨在2024年1月大選前告訴選民，民進黨是美臺關係最佳管理者？臺灣民衆和業界需要爲一攬子協議做好準備，這些協議從表面上看可能是雙邊的，但鑑於議程項目的性質，可能會要求臺灣比美國做出更多的行動，對美開放市場。如果達成雙邊協議，民進黨立院黨團是否會快速或逐條審查協議？國民黨立院黨團會反對這些協議還是堅持朱立倫主席的「親美」政策？
四、新任衆院議長麥卡錫會訪臺嗎：衆議院共和黨議員普遍支持裴洛西議長去年8月訪臺，麥卡錫也頻頻談及中國問題。在他的領導下，衆議院共和黨少數派成立了「中國工作小組」（邀請駐美代表蕭美琴出席），他將任命一個兩黨「特別委員會」進一步調查中國問題。如果麥卡錫提出訪臺，拜登政府會不會比反對裴洛西訪臺更積極？拜登幾乎沒有大力反對裴洛西的訪問，這既是因爲他們的長期關係，也是因爲她是即將卸任的衆議院議長。不管怎樣，這次訪問的費用最終還是要由臺灣埋單，所以，如果麥卡錫提出訪臺，最主要的決定者還是蔡英文總統。
五、其他問題：美臺關係中值得關注的其他問題包括協助臺灣實質參與多邊組織、重要武器銷售、拜登政府官員訪問臺灣（儘管內閣部長訪問不太可能）、邀請臺灣官員參加美國主辦的多邊活動（2021年12月的民主峰會顯示了拜登政府將臺灣納入其中的意願有侷限性），宣佈更多的雙邊倡議以增加許多現有倡議。
筆者觀察到許多外國政治評論員對於臺灣的政治生態瞭解不夠深入，導致他們的評論流於空泛。例如，政治大學某位美國教員在去年地方選舉前公開預測前衛福部長陳時中是民進黨推出了的「強力臺北市長人選」，並認爲民進黨「絕對可以獲得勝利」，筆者猜想他應該會很希望他公開發表評論的媒體也如通訊軟體有「收回」的功能。
放眼2024年臺灣大選，筆者認爲我們最「不」應該關注的，就是一些自稱專家的外國政治評論家怎麼預測臺灣的選舉，以最近CSIS發表的臺海兵推報告爲例，此報告一出，可能重挫臺灣人的民心與士氣，進而影響選民的投票選擇，因此筆者建議臺灣的朋友們，可以客觀參考外國評論，但不需要過度迎合。而臺灣的選民更擦亮眼睛，避免被外來的不負責言論所左右。
（作者爲美國共和黨前亞太區主席）
原文：
US – Taiwan Relations in 2023: Biden Again Restrains Taiwan?
By Ross Darrell Feingold
Former Asia Chairman, Republicans Abroad
Twitter: @RossFeingold
For 2022, this author opined that the Biden Administration would impose a “Temporary Restraining Order” on Taiwan (“TRO” are the initials of the favored name change to Taiwan Representative Office of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office that Taiwan supporters in the US Congress hoped, but failed, to make a reality in 2022). Potential TRO items for 2022 included the resumption of trade negotiations notwithstanding the result of the ractopamine pork referendum, denying Taiwan an invitation to the RIMPAC exercise, or the nature of public activities in the United States should President Tsai or Vice President William Lai transit the United States on their way to or from Central American or the Caribbean.
As it turned out, the United States did not invite Taiwan to join the Indo Pacific Economic Framework (and instead offered the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade), Taiwan was not invited to RIMPAC, and Vice President Lai had quick and low profile stop-overs on his way to the inauguration in Honduras of new President Xiomara Castro in January 2022.
Rather than make predictions about US-Taiwan relations in 2023, here are five things to watch:
1. Will the United States Welcome Taiwan’s Candidates for President to Visit: In recent election cycles candidates for President have developed the odd habit of visiting Washington DC, prior to the election. Democratic Progressive Party Tsai Ing-wen visited Washington DC in 2015 and 2011, and Chinese Nationalist Party Chairman Eric Chu visited Washington DC in 2015 (and again in 2022 as part of his “shadow” presidential campaign). This author dislikes the image of Taiwan presidential candidates visiting Washington DC to seek the affirmation of the United States government. Candidates for Taiwan President should not waste their time (or the time of US government officials) having conversations that can easily occur here in Taipei, and it would be a mistake for the Chinese Nationalist Party candidate, or Taiwan People’s Party candidate Ko Wen-je, to visit Washington DC.
2. Will Candidates for US President Visit Taiwan: The primaries for United President political party presidential nominations will begin in January 2024. For candidates who seek the Republican nomination, a visit to Taiwan is one way to prove they have better “Oppose China, Protect Taiwan” (抗中，保臺) credentials than the other candidates. Potential candidate Mike Pompeo visited Taiwan two times in 2022. Other potential candidates might visit, including Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, who is popular with Republican voters across the country, has the resources of his state government to use on a visit to Taiwan which can be under the guise of promoting Florida exports, and who made China an issue he campaigned on in his successful re-election campaign last year.
3. U.S.-Taiwan Initiative for 21st Century Trade: Will agreements be announced in the second half of this year to help the Democratic Progressive Party tell voters prior to the January 2024 election that the DPP is the better manager of US-Taiwan relations? The Taiwan public and industry needs to be prepared for a package of agreements that might, on paper, sound bilateral, but will likely be one sided given that the nature of the agenda items require Taiwan to take more action than the United States to open Taiwan’s market to U.S. companies. If a bilateral agreement is reached, will the Democratic Progressive Party Legislative Yuan Caucus conduct a quick, or thorough, review of the agreements? Will the Chinese Nationalist Party Legislative Yuan Caucus oppose the agreements or adhere to Chairman Eric Chu’s “close to the United States” (親美) policy?
4. Speaker Kevin McCarthy: Will new Speaker of the House of Representatives Kevin McCarthy visit Taiwan? Republican House members generally supported Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan last August, and McCarthy frequently discusses China issues. Under his leadership, the Republican minority in the House established a “China Task Force” (which Representative to the US Hsiao Bi-khim met with), and he will appoint a bi-partisan “select committee” to further investigate China issues. If McCarthy proposes to visit Taiwan, will the Biden Administration oppose the visit more aggressively than it opposed Pelosi’s visit? Biden made minimal effort to oppose Pelosi’s visit, both because of their long-time relationship and the reality that she was the outgoing House Speaker. Regardless, the cost of the visit will ultimately be borne by the military and people of Taiwan, so, if McCarthy proposes to visit Taiwan, the most important decisionmaker is President Tsai.
5. Other Issues: Among the other issues to watch in US-Taiwan relations are assistance with Taiwan’s substantive participation in multilateral organizations, significant weapons sales, visits to Taiwan by Biden Administration officials (though a cabinet secretary visit is unlikely), invitations for Taiwan officials to attend US-hosted multilateral events (the Democracy Summit in December 2021 shows the limits of the Biden Administration’s willingness to include Taiwan), announcements of even more bilateral initiatives to add to many existing ones.
Foreign commentators who try to predict events in Taiwan politics are often inaccurate. By way of example, an American faculty member at National Chengchi University co-authored a commentary prior to the local election last year that predicted former Health and Welfare Minister Chen Shih-chung is a “strong candidate” for the Democratic Progressive Party in Taipei City, and the Democratic Progressive Party “certainly is in a position to see great success come this fall.” We know how that worked out for the DPP.
Thus, perhaps the most important thing to avoid watching in 2023, an election year in Taiwan prior to voting in January 2024, is the extent to which foreigners try to tell the world what will happen in Taiwan or between Taiwan and China. The recent CSIS “wargame” is a good example, because the wargame’s conclusion might demoralize voters and influence their choice in the upcoming election. This author suggests Taiwan politicians avoid pandering to such foreign commentators, and Taiwan voters ignore them.